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A. PURPOSE OF THE THESIS 
The main purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between graduate 
education and the job performance of Department of Defense (DoD) civilian employees. 
The thesis will focus on promotion speed and other selected job performance measures 
for all civilian DoD personnel employed between 1986 and 1999, except for those in the 
National Imagery and Mapping Agency and direct and indirect hire civilian employees 
outside the 50 states and the District of Columbia. The Defense Manpower Data Center 
(DMDC) provided the personnel data. Other performance measures that are analyzed 
include performance ratings, earnings and retention. 
The primary question for this analysis is What is the effect of graduate education 
on the job performance of DoD civilian employees? The secondary questions that 
reinforce the primary question are: (1) Does the possession of a Master’s degree result in 
faster promotion, higher earnings, and better performance ratings? (2) Does the effect of 
a Master’s vary among DoD occupations and functional areas? (3) Does the DoD 
personnel structure reward the investment in human capital represented by the Master’s 
degree? 
DoD civilians are paid according to commonly structured pay tables. The largest 
portion of DoD civilian employees, especially white-collar personnel, is covered by the 
General Schedule (GS) pay system. This system is built on the concept that equal 
payment will be provided for equal work and that salary differences between non-federal 
employees and DoD employees will be compared periodically. Yet a commonly asked 
question is whether the common pay table is sufficient enough to attract, motivate, and 
retain highly educated and high quality personnel who have other opportunities in the 
civilian market.  This thesis will research whether more highly educated civilian 
employees are paid more and are promoted faster. It will also examine their retention 
behavior. 
In September 1999, Usan and Utoglu [Ref:7] analyzed the effect of graduate 
education using the same database. However, to obtain a different perspective of the 
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effects of graduate education on DoD civilian employees’ performance, this thesis 
analyzes the same performance measures, but uses different methodologies. Usan and 
Utoglu used three bivariate logit models to estimate promotion, retention and 
performance ratings models. In addition, they estimated the level of employee salaries 
using a semi-log model. The pay, promotion, retention and performance evaluation 
models estimated in this thesis will be specified differently from those estimated by Usan 
and Utoglu. The differences between this thesis and the research by Usan and Utoglu are 
explained below. 
To analyze promotion outcomes, Usan and Utoglu analyzed current civilian 
employees in the DoD as of 1986 and followed them until 1992. A dummy variable was 
created based on whether the employees were promoted at least once during this six-year 
period. This outcome of at least one promotion in a six-year period was used as criterion 
for tracking the effect of graduate education on performance. However, a superior 
measure of promotion would be to measure promotion speed or the number of 
promotions over a given period rather than defining promotion based on only a single 
promotion incident over such a long period. 
 As a measure for retention, Usan and Utoglu analyzed the retention behavior of 
DoD employees between 1986 and 1992. If the employees were still in the federal service 
in 1992, then they were coded as stayers. This methodology also did not analyze the 
length of service of employees before separation. 
As a third measure of performance, Usan and Utoglu used the average 
performance rating of employees between 1986 and 1992. Since little variation was 
observed in performance ratings among employees, the results might not provide precise 
estimates of the relationship between graduate education and performance ratings. 
Therefore, this thesis identifies superior performers as those who receive the highest 
performance ratings. Also, high performing employees are often placed in supervisory 
positions as a reward for their performance. Therefore, when workers are promoted to 
supervisors, this can be a useful performance measure. 
 3 
 Lastly, Usan and Utoglu analyzed the 1986-year salary level. However, the 
percentage increases of salary overtime in real terms may indicate the impact of graduate 
education on earnings more accurately. 
    
B. BACKGROUND 
In this section the basic personnel management system for DoD civilian personnel 
is reviewed to understand the performance, promotion, and pay systems. This information 
is useful background for understanding the models presented in this thesis.  
1. Pay systems of DoD civilians 
Federal government employees in the Executive Branch [Ref:10] are paid 
according to various pay systems. Most federal employees are paid under one of two 
main government pay systems: (1) the “general schedule” (GS) pay system, which sets 
specific salary levels for federal white collar workers, or (2) the “wage system rates” 
which are paid to the government’s craft and trade (blue-collar) workers. The GS pay 
system covers approximately half of the federal workforce [Ref:11]. 
 The general schedule is composed of 15 grades, or salary levels. Each grade 
includes ten steps through which employees advance based on satisfactory job 
performance and length of service. For all GS grades, Table 1 shows the waiting periods 
for advancement to each higher step.  Employees who have not reached the highest step 
for a particular position are generally advanced to the next step when they complete the 
required waiting period. This is true only if the employee’s rating of record for the most 
recently completed appraisal period is rated at least “Fully Successful” or equivalent, and 
also if no equivalent increase was received during the waiting period. Supervisors of 
other GS employees are ordinarily classified at least one grade higher than their 
subordinates. However, this doesn’t necessarily mean that supervisors will be paid more 
than all of their subordinates. 
 For GS employees, two types of annual pay adjustments exist: (1) a national, 
across-the-board increase; and (2) a locality-based pay adjustment. The annual across-
the-board increase is normally paid in January of each year (along with the locality pay 
adjustment). The amount of this increase is normally based on the annual percentage 
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change in the Employment Cost Index (ECI). The ECI is a statistical indicator, which the 
Bureau of Labor statistics maintains, and measures changes in private sector labor costs. 
Similarly the locality-based pay adjustments are designed to address a gap between 
federal and civilian salaries that White House and congressional leaders feel impose a 
hardship on employees and leave the government unable to compete in the labor market. 
Table 1.   Step Increases of GS Personnel 
 
From Step To Step Weeks
1 2 52 
2 3 52 
3 4 52 
4 5 104 
5 6 104 
6 7 104 
7 8 156 
8 9 156 
9 10 156 
 Source: From [Ref: 9:p.31] 
When an employee is promoted or transferred from a position in one GS grade to 
a position in a higher GS grade, the individual is entitled to basic pay at a rate not less 
than two step-increases (within-grade) above the employee’s original basic rate of pay 
before the promotion. In other words, a GS-4, step 5 must receive, as a minimum, the pay 
of a GS-4, step 7 upon promotion to GS-5.   
In contrast to the GS pay rates; the pay of federal government’s wage-system 
employees is fixed as an hourly rate by the lead agencies. Pay rates for wage system 
employees are set as an hourly rate and are legally required to be adjusted from time to 
time consistent with prevailing rates. The wage system’s prevailing rate determinations 
are made on the basis of surveys of rates paid by private employers in each local area for 
 5 
work similar to that performed by federal wage employees. There are around 133 local 
wage areas. Each wage area pay scale is divided into three classes: WG (worker); WL 
(leader); WS (supervisor). The WG and WL classes of pay rates each have 15 grades with 
5 steps in each. 
2. Promotions in the Federal Service 
A promotion is a change to a higher grade and should not be confused with 
periodic “within-grade increases” or “quality step increases,” which provide salary 
increases within the scheduled rates of the grade. Opportunities for advancement occur 
when new positions are established because of reorganization, added program 
responsibilities, or when an employee vacates a position. Competition among employees 
is generally required [Ref:11: p.230]. 
For promotion from one position to another, the employees should also meet 
time-in-grade requirements. For example, for advancement to positions at GS-12 or 
above, the candidate must have completed a minimum of 52 weeks in a position no more 
than one grade lower than the position to be filled. For advancement to positions at GS-6 
through GS-11, candidates must have completed again a minimum of 52 weeks in a 
position no more than one or two grades lower depending on the position grade intervals.  
Advancements to positions up to GS-5 have no restrictions if the employees completed 
52 weeks in the lower grades.  
Each agency must have a Merit Promotion Plan complying with the requirements 
of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). The main purpose of the Merit 
Promotion Plan is to ensure the selection of the best-qualified candidates to open 
positions. Merit promotions should not be confused with within-grade pay increases, as 
they involve a formal move to a higher grade [Ref:10: p.159]. 
A candidate selected for a first-level supervisory or managerial job must serve a 
probationary period of one year. The probationary period for new managers and 
supervisors is intended to assess their supervisory and managerial skills and abilities, not 
to test them on technical or program knowledge. First-time supervisors and managers 
who do not satisfactorily complete the trial period will be returned to positions of no 
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lower pay and grade than those they occupied before assuming their management or 
supervisory assignments.  
Although all promotions must follow merit procedures, they do not all require 
competition among employees. Some jobs are filled by “career promotion.” For example, 
if an employee has been selected competitively for a trainee or understudy position, or for 
another position with a known promotional potential or career ladder, which provides for 
consecutive promotions, and the employee performs satisfactorily then the employee is 
eligible for promotion without additional competition until the full performance level of 
the position is reached. 
3. Performance appraisal systems   
Federal employees are subject to periodic appraisals of their job performance. The 
rating levels are shown in Table 2.  DoD civilians are classified according to five 
different rating levels. These performance appraisal levels can have an impact on a wide 
variety of personnel and employment decisions affecting federal employees. For 
example, employees can be reassigned, demoted, promoted, or removed from the job if 
the individual continues to have “Unsatisfactory” performance. The appraisal systems 
must be based on objective job related criteria, and performance standards must be 
developed for each element of the job on which an employee is evaluated. If an 
employee’s most recent rating of record (formal summary rating) is below Fully 
Successful (level 3), the agency is required to deny the employee’s within-grade increase.  
Table 2.   Performance Appraisal Levels 
 
Levels Meanings of Codes 
1 Outstanding 
2 Exceeds Fully Successful
3 Fully Successful 
4 Minimally Successful 
5 Unsatisfactory 
                                        Source: From [Ref: 7]  
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C. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter II briefly reviews studies of 
the relationship between human capital and job performance of individual companies. 
Also this chapter summarizes the analyses of DoD employees’ job performance. Chapter 
III describes the data set used in this thesis and explains the methodologies used to model 
promotion speed, the length of time to separation, and annual salary increases. Chapter 
IV estimates the performance models and describes the results of the performance 
models. Chapter V summarizes the results of the analysis and makes recommendations 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. PREVIOUS STUDIES OF GRADUATE EDUCATION 
No completely satisfactory method of measuring job performance, or even 
defining it, seems to exist. According to human capital theory, an individual’s 
productivity and earnings increase with additional education. Yet studies have not been 
able to discriminate between the various and often contradictory explanations for the 
positive relationship between earnings and education. Some questions about the effect of 
education on job performance have been posed in the literature. For example, does 
academic education really develop the personal capacities of employees, or does it only 
serve as an element of a screening process, which signals employers about the skills of 
individuals who are inherently more productive? Owing to such questions, many 
researchers have examined the benefits to employees of seeking higher education. In their 
studies, they have found some contradictory results on the effects of education on job 
productivity. Some researchers have found a high correlation between academic 
achievement and job performance. Others have suggested that education only provides 
credentials or signal, which help the firm to filter job applicants. 
David A. Wise, intrigued by these problems, conducted two studies on job 
performance [Ref:1]. In his first study he wanted to answer two main questions. (1) Was 
academic achievement related to job performance? (2) Was this relation due to personal 
characteristics or other cognitive skills gained in school? 
To find answers, Wise estimated a salary model with ordinary least squares. The 
explanatory variables basically included the level of education, the type of education, 
prior employment experience, academic achievement, and other personal characteristics, 
namely leadership ability, socioeconomic background, and desire for job security. The 
results showed that nonacademic attributes were as important as academic abilities in 
determining job performance. He found leadership ability and initiative were positively 
related to job performance while he observed a negative relationship between 
performance and an individual’s desire for job security and job success. Graduate 
education was also correlated with higher job performance in accordance with human 
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capital theory. Employees with graduate degrees and who were at the top 5% of their 
class received the highest salary increases in the model.  
In his second study, David A. Wise [Ref:2] asked the same questions as in his 
previous study with the same data and explanatory variables, but unlike his first study, he 
used maximum likelihood techniques to estimate the relation between promotion and 
education. He thought that the rate of upward movement of an individual might be a more 
direct measure of job performance than the rate of salary increase. One problem with 
using salary is that salaries are assigned to positions rather than to individuals. Therefore, 
salary does not accurately indicate an individual employee’s performance. Second, salary 
was automatically increased based on years employed even if the employee was not 
promoted from one level to the next.  
Wise’s results were, however, consistent with his previous study. The estimated 
coefficient had the same sign and similar magnitude in both studies. A graduate degree 
had a greater effect on the promotion probability than it had on salary even for the 
employees ranked at the bottom of the class. In both of Wise’s studies, the hypothesis of 
“no relationship between education and job performance” was rejected. Also 
nonacademic characteristics proved to be as important as the effect of academic 
achievement on job performance.  
James L. Medoff and Katharine G. Abraham found some interesting results that 
appeared to contradict human capital theory [Ref:3;Ref:4]. They wanted to learn whether 
additional earnings resulting from more human capital could be explained by higher job 
productivity. In their first study [Ref:3], they built a semi-log salary model. The data was 
obtained from a computerized personnel file of a large U.S. manufacturing firm. The data 
consisted of white males and included information on: the employee’s education, length 
of service, date of birth, physical work location, current job grade, date of entry into 
current job grade, current salary, and recent salary. Also, the data included two measures 
of the employee’s performance and assessment of the employee’s potential for 
advancement. The firm, which Medoff and Abraham selected for their study, did not use 
a classical supervisor ranking system. Rather, performance evaluations were based on the 
consensus of a committee of supervisors who evaluated each employee relative to a 
 11 
group of his or her peers. In their study, basic salary was the only payment to the 
employees; no employees received any bonuses or other payments, which could bias the 
salary results.  
The explanatory variables in the salary model included the level of education, pre-
company experience, company service, performance ratings, grade level dummies, and 
region dummies. Medoff and Abraham ran the models three times. In the first run, they 
excluded grade dummies and the performance rating. In the second run, they added the 
grade level to determine the difference in every grade level. Lastly, in their third run, they 
included both grade levels and performance ratings to analyze the independent relation 
between performance and the other explanatory variables.  
In the first model, the estimation results were consistent with human capital 
theory. Employees having a high school diploma or less received 13% and 23% lower 
earnings compared to college graduates. Having a Master’s degree or doctorate increased 
earnings 10% and 21%, respectively.  Pre-company experience and years in service were 
also positively related to salary.  
In the second model, which included grade levels, the coefficients of the 
education variable dropped significantly. The effect of a Master’s degree on salary fell 
from 10% to only 2%, which indicated that the Master’s degree holders were assigned to 
jobs in higher grades. Similarly, pre-company experience and years in service also lost 
some of their effects on the salary. Lastly, before adding the performance ratings to the 
model, Medoff and Abraham assumed that if a relationship existed between performance 
ratings and earnings, then the coefficients of education and the other variables in the 
model would drop to zero. When the third model was run, the results were similar to the 
second model, which implied that performance ratings could not explain the effect of the 
explanatory variables, such as education, pre-company experience, and years in service.  
In their second study, [Ref:4] Medoff and Abraham also analyzed the relation 
between experience and job performance using cross-sectional longitudinal data. They 
used performance rating as an indicator of job performance. They explored whether 
higher relative earnings indicated that more experienced managers and professionals were 
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relatively more productive than their less experienced peers. The same data from the first 
study were used in their second study. 
 Using cross-sectional data Medoff and Abraham [Ref: 4] built a semi-log salary 
model. The results were similar to their first study. When the model controlled for grade 
level, the coefficients of education dropped significantly from 10% to 2% for a Master’s 
and from 24% to 5% for a Doctorate. But when the performance rating dummies were 
introduced into the model within grade levels, the coefficients did not move toward zero. 
This result implied that managers and professionals who received higher earnings 
performed no better than less senior managers and professionals in the same grade levels. 
So this result was not consistent with the usual human capital or on-the-job training 
model.   
In their longitudinal data between 1972 and 1976, two separate salary variables 
and two separate performance variables were modeled. It was observed that for those 
remaining in a given grade level, the passage of time affects “within-grade-level salary 
position” much differently than it affects “within-grade-level performance position.” 
Over time, while employees did not change grade levels, “within-grade-level salary” 
appears to rise substantially, while relative “within-grade-level performance” appeared to 
remain roughly stable or deteriorated. Again these results were contrary to the human 
capital explanation of the experience-earnings profile.   
William R. Bowman and Stephen L. Mehay [Ref:6] analyzed the relationship 
between on-the-job productivity and graduate education.  The study used the promotion 
of Navy officers as the performance measure. A probit model estimated the promotion 
probability. Bowman and Mehay used a unique data consisting of 4,471 professional and 
technical officers in the Navy’s Promotion History File between 1985 and 1990. This 
data, which provided background information, were augmented with supervisors’ 
evaluations (fitness reports) prior to the grade 4 promotion level. Officers were classified 
in two categories: line and staff. Line officers work in primary occupations like aviation, 
ship, and submarine operations. Staff officers are generally in administrative jobs. The 
career paths and the difficulty of jobs are similar within occupational categories. The 
officers were evaluated or promoted according to their relative performance within their 
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own communities (occupational category). Since the Navy personnel system is 
characterized by an internal labor market with a vertical hierarchy, promotion to grade 4 
is the first significant control point in an officer’s career and involves an up-or-out 
decision. 
When Bowman and Mehay estimated a single-stage grade 4 promotion model, 
they noticed that officers with any graduate education were more likely to be promoted. 
They questioned whether graduate education was the sole cause or whether other 
unobserved cognitive and affective skills caused an officer to select the Navy-funded, 
full-time graduate education program. Is so, self-selection would bias the effect of 
education on the officer promotion probability. Two sources of selection were discussed. 
First, a potential administrative bias existed because the Navy chose officers for graduate 
education according to their abilities. Second, officers chose to attend graduate education 
on the expectation that the benefits (higher promotion probability) would be greater than 
the costs of additional service time. Both selection sources could create a self-selection 
bias in the single-stage promotion model.  
In the promotion model, cognitive abilities were specified as a function of college 
grade point average, a technical undergraduate degree in science, engineering, or 
mathematics, or a graduate degree. Affective skills were represented by the accession 
source (the Naval Academy, an ROTC scholarship, the Officer Candidate School (OCS), 
or the enlisted ranks). The model also included demographic factors, such as sex and 
race, marital and family status, and fiscal year dummies. To be able to eliminate selection 
bias, the authors introduced controls to the model for academic background and early 
career performance. These controls were proxied by college GPA and early performance 
rating scores (based on being recommended for early promotion). When these controls 
were included in the model, the coefficient of the Master degree dropped 20%.  
In addition to these controls, the authors also used a bivariate probit model to 
include the portion of each person’s preferences for education not captured by the GPA 
and early performance rating proxies, which were correlated with the actual possession of 
a graduate degree but not with promotion. To be able to capture that bias, they used a 
probit model for the determinants of graduate school attendance. The attendance 
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depended on the expected returns and individual characteristics such as sex, age, marital 
status, and race/ethnicity. Since the cost of attending a graduate program varied across 
occupational specialties, the sub-specialties within line and staff occupations were also 
included in the model. In some specialties, leaving the operational environment to attend 
graduate school is very costly. In other specialties because of strong civilian career 
opportunities, the opportunity cost of attending graduate school is quite high. Therefore, 
personal preferences were proxied by information in the data file about whether each 
officer would accept an offer to attend graduate school if he or she were offered the 
program.  
The two-stage bivariate probit results indicated that a large part of the promotion 
effects in the single-stage models was due to the selection of more able officers into the 
graduate education program. The positive selection effect also varied in two broad 
occupational areas. For line officers, the Master’s coefficient in the bivariate model was 
25% smaller than in the single-stage model; for staff officers the Master’s coefficient fell 
50%.  
In the same study, Bowman and Mehay analyzed the effect of a fully funded 
graduate program. Because the fully funded program generally provided firm specific 
training, they tested whether the impact of a Master’s on promotion was due to the firm-
specific training or to general training. Bowman and Mehay ran the single-stage probit 
models and the bivariate probit models for any Master’s degree and they ran the models 
for government-funded degrees. In both cases, the comparison group consisted of those 
without a Master’s.  
In Table 3 and Table 4 (compare column 1 of each table) the return to a funded 
Master’s for line officers is nearly double that for any Master’s. For staff officers, the 
return is 20% higher than for any Master’s degrees. These tables also indicated that the 
selection bias was greater for the Navy funded graduate programs than for any other 
Master’s program. When the single-stage model controlled for performance and ability, 
the return to the Navy funded Master’s for line officers decreased about one-half, 
whereas it only dropped about one-third for any other Master’s; for staff officers, the 
return to any Master’s was reduced by two-thirds in Table 3.  However, the return to 
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funded Master’s was reduced by nearly three-quarters in Table 4.  From these results, it 
was concluded that both firm-specific and general types of investments provided a 
positive return to officers in the Navy. 
Table 3.     Coefficient of Any Master’s Degree in Single-Stage and Bivariate 
Probit Models  
 
 (1) 
No Controls for  
Ability/Performance
(2) 























                       Source: From [Ref:6] 
                        a Standard errors in parentheses. 
                        b Marginal effects in brackets. 
 
Table 4.   Coefficient of Fully-Funded Master’s Degree in Single-Stage and 
Bivariate Probit Models  
 
 (1) 
No Controls for  
Ability/Performance
(2) 























                       Source: From [Ref:6] 
                        a Standard errors in parentheses. 





B. PREVIOUS STUDIES ON DOD EMPLOYEES  
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Of the various studies about the relationship between education and the job 
performance of DoD civilian employees, most have found a positive correlation between 
human capital and earnings. Yet some studies suggested that there was no relation or 
there was a negative relation between experience and relative earnings. Generally, such 
results are consistent with human capital theories. 
Bruce H. Dunson [Ref:5] analyzed DoD civilian employees and the relationship 
between earnings, experience and productivity. Actually this analysis replicated Medoff 
and Abraham’s studies on the employees of the previously mentioned manufacturing 
firms. Dunson wondered whether he would find the same results for DoD civilian 
employees as Medoff and Abraham found for private sector employees. He questioned 
whether more educated or more experienced workers earn more than less educated and 
less experienced employees. He also questioned whether earning differentials occurred 
within grade levels. Most importantly, he wanted to learn whether more educated and 
more experienced employees would also be more productive within grade levels. 
The data were obtained from the Department of Defense Civilian Master and 
Transaction File. The study consisted of white male employees working full-time in 
either administrative or professional jobs in the DoD in grades 13-15. In his semi-log 
earnings model, education level, prior experience, service years and dummy variables for 
physical work locations of DoD employees were created.  Education level was 
categorized into five different classes: less than high school, high school, a Bachelor 
degree, a Master’s degree, or a professional degree and a Doctorate. He used entry age as 
an indicator of prior experience. Basically, Dunson followed the same methodology as in 
Medoff and Abraham’s studies and ran the model three times. In the first run, he 
excluded performance ratings and grades from the model and estimated the coefficients 
of the explanatory variables. The results suggested that having a Master’s degree had 
little effect on earnings. In all cases, having a Master’s degree increased earnings by only 
11%. On the other hand, one more year of tenure beyond the mean number of years 
increased earnings by 4 or 5%. In the second run, grade levels were introduced to the 
model. The results suggested, like Abraham and Medoff’s studies, that “within-grade 
earnings” were consistently smaller for personnel with a Master’s or professional degree 
compared to only a Bachelor’s degree. When the second model was run with 
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performance ratings added, Dunson observed that personnel with higher performance 
ratings earned more than personnel with poorer performance ratings. But the difference 
between earnings associated with performance evaluations was extremely low. Most 
importantly, no relationship was found between education and productivity. Again this 
result was consistent with Abraham and Medoff’s studies, which contradicted the human 
capital theory. 
In 1999, Usan and Utoglu [Ref:7] also examined the effects of graduate education 
on the performance of DoD personnel using several performance measures: salary level, 
promotion, retention, and performance rating. They estimated the salary model with the 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) technique. The other models were analyzed using binary 
logit techniques. The same data was used in this thesis and in the Usan and Utoglu study 
provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. DMDC provided two personnel files to 
profile DoD Civilian personnel. These two files have similar data elements. Usan and 
Utoglu merged the two files for personnel working in the DoD between 1986 and 1999. 
The data consisted of observations made on DoD employees every two years. The data 
were restricted to personnel with at least a Bachelor’s degree.  
Usan and Utoglu built a semi-log salary model to cover all employees in 1986.  
Background variables were included to account for differences in education. Since 
experience highly affected earnings, they used federal years in the federal service and 
prior service years as indicators of experience in the federal service. Also, because 
federal salaries varied across regions due to different economic conditions, regional 
dummy variables were included in the model. Veterans were also included in the model 
to capture the impact of the DoD’s veteran’s civilian hiring preference. To capture the 
differences between different occupational categories, occupational dummies were also 
used in the model.  With the expectation that supervisory status had a positive effect on 
the earnings, the supervisor status variable was also added to the model.  
When Usan and Utoglu ran their model without controling for grade levels, they 
found that personnel with a Master’s or Doctorate earned 5% and 16% more, 
respectively, than personnel with a Bachelor’s degree. In the second run of the model 
when grades were introduced to the model, the effect of a Master’s degree and a 
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Doctorate fell to only 0.3% and 4%, respectively. These results suggested that the higher 
earnings for employees with a Master and Doctorate degree resulted because the more 
highly educated candidates entered at higher grades, which were correlated with higher 
salary. This salary model has one weakness: the authors did not attempt to track the 
percentage change of employee’s annual salary over time. 
For the promotion performance measure, Usan and Utoglu used maximum 
likelihood techniques to estimate the probability of a particular individual being 
promoted between 1986 and 1992. The basic logit equation they used can be written as 
follows: 
 
Li = ln (Pi/1-Pi) = B0 + BX+E 
 
L represented the logit, which is ln (Pi/1-Pi) or the log-odds ratio of being 
promoted. The constant term (intercept) B0 was the value of L if X were zero. B was the 
change in L for a change in X.  X represented all the explanatory variables in the model. 
The authors used the cumulative logistic distribution function to determine the promotion 
probability [Ref:9] 
 
Pi = 1/ 1+e- (Bo+BX) 
 
 
 Usan and Utoglu also looked at the promotion histories of employees between 
1986 and 1992. For this period, they examined the individuals’ promotion dates. If 
employees were promoted between these years, a binary dependent variable for 
promotion was created and took the value of 1; otherwise, it took the value of 0. Four 
specifications were examined in the model. In the first specification, they ran the model 
without any controls for grade levels and performance ratings. In this model, they found 
that employees with a Master’s or Doctorate were less likely to be promoted than 
 19 
employees with a Bachelor’s degree. Since the parameter estimates indicated the odds 
ratio of being promoted, the partial effects1 were computed.  Employees with a Master’s 
degree or Doctorate were 2% and 6%, respectively, less likely to promote. But when the 
grade levels were controlled, the effect of graduate education on promotion became 
positive. This result showed that since employees with a Master’s or Doctorate were 
initially placed in higher grades, advancing in their career path was more difficult for 
them.  
In the third and fourth specifications of the promotion model, similar results were 
found as in the previous two specifications. Without control for grade levels and rating 
level, the parameter estimates for Master’s and Doctorate’s were negative but smaller 
than in the first specification. This implied that no relation between job performance and 
Master’s or Doctorate’s existed. Similarly, in the fourth specification when the model 
controlled for grades and performance ratings, the parameter estimates of the Master’s 
and Doctorate’s became positive, but with a smaller partial effect on the promotion 
probability than in the second specification. Generally, education was statistically 
significant and more educated personnel were less likely to be promoted because they 
started in higher-level positions. The method Usan and Utoglu used was weak because 
the promotion probability did not calculate the time to promotion. In a six-year period, 
one employee could receive more than one promotion, so this model did not capture 
promotion speed. The effect of a Master’s might be underestimated.  
Usan and Utoglu also estimated a retention model using maximum likelihood 
techniques. Individual characteristics like sex, race, age and veteran status were used in 
the retention models. Usan and Utoglu used different functional areas such as capturing 
to capture differences between work environments. Education levels and federal service 
years were also considered as well as the average performance ratings of available years. 
Similar to the promotion model, Usan and Utoglu tracked employees between 1986 and 
1992 and examined the employee’s decisions to stay or leave during this period. If 
                                                 
1 The partial effect of each explanatory variable is the difference between the probability 
of the base case (all dummy variables set to zero and continuous variables set to their 
means) and the probability of the case where each explanatory variable is increased by 
one unit while all other variables remain at their base levels. 
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employees were still in the federal service in 1992, then the retention variable was coded 
1; otherwise it took the value of 0. They excluded employees with more than 15 years of 
service from the analysis because of the powerful influence of retirement benefits on 
employees’ stay or leave decisions.  
They estimated two retention models: one for all employees and one restricted to 
those who were newly hired in 1986. The coefficients obtained from these two models 
also were converted to partial effects. Employees with a Master’s or Doctorate were 1.5% 
more likely to leave the service compared to employees with a Bachelor’s degree, 
holding all other variables constant. For new hires, similar results were found: both 
Master’s and Doctorate degree holders were 5% more likely to leave the service than 
those with a Bachelor’s degree. Consequently, these results confirmed the economic 
theories that the higher educated and younger employees were more mobile in the job 
market. 
Usan and Utoglu also estimated a performance-rating model with a maximum 
likelihood technique. The average of all ratings between 1986 and 1994 were calculated 
for all employees’ data and for new hires in 1986. Employees whose ratings exceeded 
this average were coded 1; otherwise they were coded 0 for the dependent variable. 
Similar explanatory variables were used for both models, but service years were not 
included in the model for 1986 new hires. Usan and Utoglu found that employees with a 
Master’s and a Doctorate were significantly more likely to receive higher performance 
ratings than employees with a Bachelor’s degree. This result supported the hypothesis 
that more education improved an individual’s adaptability or ability to cope with job 
demands and became an important determinant of career success. 
As a summary of all these models, Master’s degree holders earned higher annual 
salaries and were more likely to promote. They were also more productive despite the 
findings of Dunson (1985) and Medoff and Abraham (1980) that there was no relation 
between human capital and on-the-job performance. 
Lastly, Beth Asch [Ref:8] conducted a detailed study of the pay, promotion and 
retention of DoD civilian employees. She wanted to explore whether DoD pay and 
promotion systems were efficient enough to attract, to motivate and to retain more highly 
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qualified workers. She analyzed whether higher-educated people were paid more, 
promoted faster and stayed longer. She used the DMDC personnel files of civil service 
GS personnel. The data she used tracked individuals who entered and reentered the DoD 
civil service between fiscal 1982 and fiscal 1996. The data consisted of information on 
entry characteristics, and how these characteristics varied over each individual’s career, 
on pay levels, on promotion events and timing, and on the timing of exits from the DoD 
civil service.  She tracked two different cohorts to explain the differences before and after 
the DoD personnel drawdown. The fiscal 1988 cohort included 31,912 civil service 
employees who entered or reentered in 1988. The fiscal 1992 cohort consisted of 19,744 
civil service employees who entered or reentered in 1992. 
 Asch used three measures of personnel quality: education, supervisor rating and 
promotion speed. She also assessed the advantages and disadvantages of these measures. 
For example, education level was measured with error in the DMDC dataset. To 
eliminate possible biases related to education level, she used only the entry education 
level, which appeared to be measured accurately. Supervisor ratings were used to see 
how well employees performed in their jobs from the supervisors’ perspectives. 
Unfortunately, such ratings did not provide much variation and were missing for those 
who were in their first year of service. Promotion speed provided more variation across 
personnel and captured how well matched the employees were with the civil service jobs. 
However, promotion speed was observed only for those who stayed in the service, which 
could lead to biased results. Someone who did not leave the service, might have a taste 
for the civil service, so the effects could be overstated. In her study, Asch used some 
statistical techniques to overcome these weaknesses. 
In the salary model, she used ordinary least-squares regressions to measure the 
effect of education on salary. To test for biases, she analyzed each cohort to a certain 
point; if there were some differences in the estimates, then there could be a selection bias. 
She divided each cohort data into two groups: those who separated at year t, and those 
who stayed beyond year t. For the fiscal 1988 cohort, she estimated the results for 
employees who stayed until YOS 8 or beyond. For the fiscal 1992 cohort, she estimated 
the equations until YOS 4 and beyond. If the results did not differ much, then a selection 
bias was not a serious problem.  
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 Table 5 describes the variables used in the Asch study. Table 6 displays some of 
her results. For the fiscal 1988 cohort, employees with a Master’s degree, who stayed 
beyond YOS 8, earned 7.3 % more than employees with no college education. Employees 
with a Master’s degree who separated at YOS 8 earned 5.3 % more than non-college 
graduates. For the fiscal 1992 cohort, similar results were estimated (see Table 6.  She 
pointed out that the results for education might be underestimated because bonuses were 
excluded from the earnings measure. The names of the variables used in Asch study are 
listed below. 
Table 5.   Names of the Variables used in the Asch Study 
 
Names Definition 
MNYOSO Months in service at entry 
MNPROM1 Months to first promotion 
CUMRAT1 Cumulative fraction of “outstanding” ratings  
CUMRAT2 Cumulative fraction of “exceeds fully successful” ratings 
CHAVRAT Cumulative number of years employees received ratings 
DMDCVET Prior military service 
EGRADE Entrygrade 
SOMECOL Education= Some college at entry 
AADEG Education=Associate degree at entry 
BADEG Education=Bachelor degree at entry 
ABOVBA Education=Above Bachelor degree at entry 
MA Education=Master degree at entry 
PH Education=Doctorate degree at entry 
TPROM1 Months to first promotion 
TPROM2 Months to second promotion 
TPROM3 Months to third promotion 
TPROM4 Months to fourth promotion 






Table 6.   Ordinary-Least Squares Regression Results from Asch, by Entry Cohort 
(Dependent Variable = Log (Annual Salary)       
                  FY88 COHORT                                     FY92 COHORT 
          Beyond YOS 8      Left at YOS 8         Beyond YOS 4       Left at YOS 4                     








SOMECOL 0.017* 0.001 0.008 0.004 0.006* 0.003 0.021** 0.009 
AADEG 0.022* 0.002 0.011 0.008 0.050* 0.005 0.047* 0.017 
BADEG 0.077* 0.002 0.078* 0.006 0.062* 0.004 0.011 0.011 
ABOVBA 0.107* 0.003 0.077* 0.011 0.081* 0.007 0.030 0.026 
MA 0.073* 0.002 0.058* 0.009 0.056* 0.005 0.068* 0.020 
PHD 0.116* 0.005 0.069* 0.019 0.078* 0.010 0.064 0.045 
   N                             103,741                   11,687                     33,629                    8,647 
   Mean Dep. Variable  10.257                    10.158                     10.140                    9.871 
   F-Statistic              7437.688                  557.763                1797.523                170.225 
   R-squared                      .843                        .783                        .785                      .578 
   Note: * = Statistical significance at one percent level 
           ** = Statistical significance at five percent level 
Source: [Ref:8] 
 
To analyze promotion speed, Asch used Cox regression models of months to first 
promotion and months to second promotion. The promotion speed can be obtained from 
the Risk Ratio column of Table 7.  For example, the Risk Ratio for AADG (Associate’s 
degree) for the FY88 cohort is 1.185, which is greater than 1. This means that the 
probability of a first promotion is 18.5 percent higher for those with an associate degree 
than it is for those with no higher education. Similarly, the hazard of first promotion for 
employees with a Master’s degree for FY88 cohort was 44.7 percent higher than 
employees with no higher education.  The hazard of second promotion for employees 
with a Master’s degree was still 13.4 % higher than the employees with no higher 
education, but the probability became smaller. 
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Table 7.   Cox Regression Model Estimates of Months to First and 
Second Promotion, 1988. 
First Promotion                  Second Promotion                                                
                  Estimate     Std. Err    Risk Ratio     Estimate     Std. Err        Risk Ratio 
MNYOSO 0.009* 0.001 1.009 0.023* 0.001 1.023 
MNPROM1    -0.023* 0.001 0.977 
CUMRAT1 0.269* 0.030 1.309 0.318* 0.034 1.374 
CUMRAT2 0.125* 0.024 1.133 0.109* 0.029 1.115 
CHAVRAT 0.040** 0.021 1.041 0.122* 0.035 1.130 
DMDCVET 0.110* 0.026 1.116 0.033 0.036 1.034 
SOMECOL 0.090* 0.020 1.094 0.065** 0.027 1.067 
AADEG 0.170* 0.037 1.185 0.108** 0.050 1.114 
BADEG 0.415* 0.027 1.515 0.239* 0.036 1.271 
ABOVBA 0.447 0.053 1.564 0.159** 0.070 1.172 
MA 0.369* 0.044 1.447 0.126** 0.061 1.134 
PHD 0.275* 0.101 1.317 0.381** 0.188 1.464 
N                       28,350                              17,423 
 %Censored       35.5                                     39.5 
-2 log         367132.2*                           169934.5* 
      
     Note: *=significant at one percent level  
             **= significant at five percent level 
     Source: [Ref:8] 
 
For 1992 cohort, similar results were found for first promotion and second 
promotion in Table 8.  The probability of first and second promotion for employees with 






Table 8.   Cox Regression Model Estimates of Months to First and Second 
Promotion, 1992  
                               First Promotion                Second Promotion 
                   Estimate       Std.Err       Risk Ratio    Estimate     Std.Err          Risk Ratio 
MNYOSO -0.009* 0.001 0.991 0.027* 0.003 1.027 
MNPROM1    0.055* 0.003 0.946 
CUMRAT1 0.297* 0.039 1.345 0.135* 0.049 1.144 
CUMRAT2 0.218* 0.039 1.244 0.036 0.047 1.036 
CHAVRAT -0.208* 0.043 0.813 0.065 0.065 1.067 
DMDCVET 0.190* 0.037 1.209 -0.008 0.058 0.992 
SOMECOL 0.247* 0.033 1.280 1.138* 0.051 1.148 
AADEG 0.213* 0.060 1.237 0.067* 0.093 1.070 
BADEG 0.429* 0.038 1.536 0.258** 1.107 1.294 
ABOVBA 0.454* 0.078 1.574 0.258** 0.107 1.294 
MA 0.457* 0.057 1.579 0.223* 0.086 1.250 
PHD 0.108* 0.136 1.114 -0.228 0.392 0.797 
N                          16,427                              7962 
%Censored           51.82                                49.76 
-2 log             123849.5*                           2646.42* 
    
   Note: * =significant at one percent level 
            **=significant at five percent level 
   Source: [Ref:8] 
For retention, Asch examined the length of time until separation for each cohort. 
She again used the Cox regression model of months until separation. In her retention 
model for each cohort, she analyzed two specifications. The first specification, in 
addition to demographics, occupations, and job locations, included three quality measures 
(entry education, supervisor rating, and months until each promotion). The second 
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specification excluded months until each promotion. For 1988 cohort, when promotion 
speed was included in the model, the probability of separation for MA’s and Ph.D.’s was 
38.3% and 50%, respectively as shown in Table 9.  However, the hazard of separation for 
a Master’s or a Doctorate decreased to 26.5% and 29.3%, respectively when promotion 
speed was excluded from the model. This result indicated that employees who promoted 
slowly stayed for shorter periods. Table 10 shows similar results for graduate education 
for 1992 cohort that supported the lower retention of the employees in 1988 cohort.  
Table 9.   Cox-Regression-Model Estimates of Months to Separation, FY88 Cohort  
       Includes Promotion Speed            Excludes Promotion Speed 
                  Estimate         Std.Err.      Risk Ratio   Estimate      Std.Err.      Risk Ratio 
CUMRAT1 0.409* 0.032 1.506 -603* 0.033 0.547 
CUMRAT2 0.347* 0.028 1.415 -0.409* 0.028 0.665 
TPROM1 -0.051* 0.001 0.950    
TPROM2 -0.054* 0.001 0.947    
TPROM3 -0.056* 0.001 0.910    
TPROM4 -0.094* 0.002 0.910    
MNYOS -0.005* 0.000 0.995 -0.003 0.000 0.997 
CHAVRAT -0.201* 0.023 0.818 -1.392* 0.024 0.249 
DMDCVET -0.422* 0.025 0.656 0.010 0.025 1.010 
EDMIS 0.351 0.335 1.420 -0.184 0.317 0.832 
SOMECOL 0.013 0.019 1.013 0.014 0.019 1.015 
AADEG -0.017* 0.038 0.983 -0.086** 0.037 0.918 
BADEG 0.135* 0.027 1.145 -0.020 0.026 0.980 
ABOVBA 0.195* 0.057 1.216 0.035 0.056 1.036 
MA 0.324* 0.045 1.383 0.235 0.043 1.265 
PHD 0.406 0.109 1.500 0.257* 0.105 1.293 
N                       28,786                               32,206 
%Censored        41.1                                   43.1 
2 log                  41209                                9585.4   
     
    Note: * =significant at the 1% 
            ** = significant at the 5%  
    Source: [Ref:8]             
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Table 10.   Cox Regression Model Estimates of Months to Separation, FY92 
Cohort 
            Includes Promotion Speed        Excludes Promotion Speed 
                                 Estimate     Std.Err.       Risk Ratio    Estimate       Std.Err.      Risk Ratio 
CUMRAT1 0.745* 0.043 2.107 0.065 0.039 1.067 
CUMRAT2 0.718* 0.045 2.051 0.183* 0.040 1,200 
TPROM1 -0.080* 0.001 0.923    
TPROM2 -0.159* 0.003 0.853    
MNYOS -0.002* 0.001 0.998 -0.031 0.001 0.970 
CHAVRAT -1.178* 0.057 0.308 -2.976* 0.055 0.051 
DMDCVET -0.422* 0.025 0.656 0.010 0.025 1.010 
SOMECOL 0.009 0.029 1.009 -0.089 0.027 0.915 
AADEG -0.052 0.056 0.949 -1.131* 0.051 0.877 
BADEG -0.043* 0.037 0.958 -0.067** 0.034 0.935 
ABOVBA 0.143* 0.092 1.154 0.006 0.086 0.994 
MA 0.054* 0.064 1.056 0.017 0.059 1.017 
PHD 0.112 0.159 1.118 -0.106 0.144 0.900 
N                       17,389                                       19,914 
%Censored        49.88                                         49.7 
-2 log                 131499.48*                               165666.64* 
       
      Note: * =significant at one percent 
              ** = significant at five percent 
      Source: [Ref:8] 
In summary, Asch’s analysis of both the FY88 and FY92 cohorts indicated that 
higher educated employees were generally paid more. Furthermore, although employees 
with any college education were promoted faster than employees with no college, 
employees with a Master’s degree or Doctorate were not found to always promote faster 
than those with only a Bachelor’s degree. The retention of employees with a Master’s or 
Doctorate degree was also poor for each cohort. The evidence on the retention of the 
employees with a Master’s or Doctorate indicated that they had superior civilian job 
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III.   DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the data set and the methodology that guides the 
specification of the models.  It also provides descriptive statistics for each data set used to 
estimate the various performance models. 
A. DATA DESCRIPTION 
This study uses the same data that Usan and Utoglu [Ref:7] used in their study. 
The data is provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). The DMDC  data 
contains two different data files: (1) an inventory (current status) file, and (2) a 
transactions (dynamic) file. Appendix A lists the data elements that were obtained for 
employees.  The two files provide information about DoD civilian personnel employed 
between 1986 and 1999, except for those employees in the National Imagery and 
Mapping Agency and those employed as direct and indirect hire civilian employees 
outside the 50 states and the District of Columbia. For this study, the two files have been 
merged into one file including only selected variables. This new file included only full-
time, career, and career conditional employees with at least a B.A. or B.S. and who were 
paid under the General Schedule or General Management (GM) pay systems.  The 
employees were tracked between 1986 and 1998 in two-year intervals. The employees’ 
data information is available in this new file through February 1999. This file was 
converted into a SAS (Statistical Application Software) file for the statistical analysis. 
The raw data file included 213,482 observations and 41 data elements. The data 
elements consisted of personal demographics and service background information such as 
sex, race, age, education years, veteran status, federal service years, functional areas, and 
work region. A full list of data elements is provided in Appendix A. In the data files some 
missing values and also miscoded values, which might bias the analysis, exist. For 
example, annual salaries in 1994 and 1996 were coded in four digits whereas all other 
annual salaries were coded in five digits. Therefore, some amendments have been made 




Table 11.   Descriptive Statistics of DoD Civilian Personnel As of 
September 1986 (Inventory Data) 
 
Variables Classification Number % 













  17,455 
    6,454 















  82,129 
  62,887 
  42,546 











  44,707 




Pay Plan GS 
GM 
174,424 



















  74,377 
  14,226 
  12,013 
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The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between graduate 
education and job performance of DoD civilian employees. Since it is difficult to measure 
the job performance of service employees, some imperfect measures must be used to 
gauge differences in employees’ job performance in the DoD. These measures of job 
performance include real annual salary level, promotion, retention, and performance 
ratings.    
For the salary model, the percentage increase of real annual salary is measured 
only for those hired in 1986.  Also, the average annual salary of employees is used for the 
same employees hired in 1986. The salary models could only take into account basic 
annual salaries because bonuses were not included in the data. Therefore, the results may 
underestimate the effect of graduate education on pay.  
The general approach for analyzing retention and promotion is to estimate binary 
logit models that focus on the factors that influence the probability of retention or 
promotion. However, these models are weak in two aspects. First, logit models consider 
only the occurrence of some event such as promotion or separation from the service 
during a fixed period, but do not consider the length of time until these events. Second, 
logit models do not consider censored data. On the other hand, survival analysis accounts 
for both the occurrence and the timing of promotions so that the variation in timing can 
also be explained. Furthermore, survival methods account for censored data.  Censoring 
occurs when the data end before the event occurs. For example, in the separation case, an 
employee may not have separated by 1999 when the data ended.  While the employee 
will separate from the civil service eventually, the separation event is not observed in the 
data. In the promotion case, censoring might occur because either the employee did not 
receive a promotion before 1999 or the employee might have separated before being 
promoted. In the former case, the employee might have been promoted after 1999, but 
this is not observed in the data set. Accounting for censoring is important because large 
numbers of observations may be censored and serious biases in logit model estimates 
may result. Therefore, in this thesis, both logit models and survival models are estimated 
to see the different effects of the same variables in two different models.  
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For the promotion model two different estimates are used based on employees 
hired in 1986. The first model, one calculates the promotion probability of employees in 
1992 using binary logit model. The second model estimates the time to first promotion 
and the probability of promotion by survival methods.  
For the retention model two models are again used to estimate the effects of 
graduate education and other personal traits on the voluntary retention decisions of DoD 
employees. The first model estimates the retention probability of employees in 1992. the 
second, a survival model estimates the length of time until separation and the probability 
of separation from the federal civilian service. 
 Two performance ratings models were used to estimate performance differences 
among employees. Since little variation in performance ratings exist, the results may not 
give concrete results if we use average performance ratings. Therefore, focusing on those 
who receive the highest performance ratings may provide substantially better results in 
distinguishing superior performers from the others. Also, better-performing employees 
often are placed in supervisory positions as a reward. Therefore, a model of the 
probability of being a supervisor is estimated to gauge job performance. 
1. Salary Models 
Numerous studies about returns to investment in human capital have 
demonstrated quite clearly that more educated workers earn more than those with less 
education. Based on the assumption that salary is one indicator of job performance, two 
different salary models are built to estimate the effect of graduate education. The first 
model estimates the average percentage salary increase of employees hired in 1986 while 
they were in the federal service. This model can be estimated by ordinary least square 
regression equations. The effects of education and other explanatory variables on salary 
are measured in percentages since the dependent variable is already measured as the 
percentage increase of salary. The equation for this model can be written as follows: 
Y = β0 + β1X + ε 
Where 
Y = real average percentage salary increase between 1986 and 1999; 
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β0  = constant term; 
X = a vector of explanatory variables that explains the variation inY; 
β1 = a vector of parameters to be estimated and; 
ε = a random error term. 
The second model estimates the average salary of employees while they are in the 
federal service. The average salaries are also measured in real terms. A semi-log model is 
specified to estimate the effect of education and other explanatory variables on salary. 
The equation for this model is: 
Ln(Y)=  β0 + β1X + ε  
Where 
Y = average salary of employees hired in1986 for the period 1986-1999 
 β0 = constant term; 
X = a vector of explanatory variables that explains the variation in ln(Y); 
β1 = a vector of parameters to be estimated and; 
ε  = a random error term. 
These two models provide a broad view of the employees’ percentage salary 
increase and their overall average salary. With the results of these two models, we can 
better understand the overall salary changes of employees while they are working in the 
DoD civilian service, and the effect of graduate degrees. 
The data is restricted to employees with a Bachelor’s degree or higher so that we 
can compare differences among similar education levels. In both models, the same 
explanatory variables are used. The explanatory variables consist of background 
variables, education variables, regional and occupational variables. Background variables 
include sex and race to explain the differences between minorities and women in the 
quality of schooling or in the types of college majors. An education level variable is also 
added to the model. However, the education variable is not recorded correctly in every 
year of the data; therefore, only the entry education level is used as an indicator of 
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education [Ref:8]. Also a variable for labor market experience is also added to the model 
with the expectation that a more experienced worker will earn more as a federal worker. 
As indicated in Chapter I, earnings differ across regions to compensate for different 
economic conditions and for differences in the cost of living. Therefore, regional 
variables were also added to the models. Since there are many different jobs in the DoD, 
general occupational variables were also included in the model to account for the effects 
of different occupations on earnings. Most importantly, the salary is correlated with the 
grade levels; therefore, the grade levels were also included in both models.  
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 12.  Since the same variables are used in 
both models, only one table is prepared for two models. 





















Hispanic  1=Hispanic 
0=Not Hispanic 
  3.50 
96.50 








Otherace 1=Other Race 
0=Not other race 
10.43 
89.57 




  6.88 
93.22 
  6.91 
93.09 
BA86 1=Employee with a Bachelor’s degree  





MA86 1=Employee with a Master’s degree  





PH86 1=Employee with a Doctorate’s degree 
0=Employee with no Doctorate’s degree 
  2.60 
97.40 
  2.58 
97.42 
Supervisor 1=Employee is a supervisor in 1986   2.36   2.81 
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0=Employee is not a supervisor in1986  97.64 97.19 
Profession 1=Employee is in a professional occupation 





Administrative 1=Employee is in an administrative occupation 
0=Employee is not in an administrative 





Technical 1=Employee is in a technical occupation 
0=Employee is not in a technical position 
  6.26 
93.74 
  7.71 
92.29 
Clerk 1=Employee is in a clerical occupation 





Otherwc 1=Employee is in other white-collar occupation 
0=Employee is in other white-collar occupation 
  0.61 
99.39 
  0.80 
99.20 
Metropolitan 1=Census region is a metropolitan 





Newengland 1=Census region is New England 
0=Census region is not New England 
  3.40 
96.60 
  3.85 
96.15 
Midatlantic 1=Census region is Mid-Atlantic 
0=Census region is Mid-Atlantic 
  9.63 
90.37 
  9.57 
90.43 
Eastnorthcent 1=Census region is East North Center 
0=Census region is not East North Center 
10.66 
89.34 
  9.41 
90.59 
Westnortcent 1=Census region is West North Center 
0=Census region is West North Center 
  4.12 
95.88 
  4.17 
95.83 
Southatlantic 1=Census region is South Atlantic 





Eastsouthatlan 1=Census region is East South Atlantic 
0=Census region is not East South Atlantic 
  4.70 
95.30 
  4.40 
95.60 
Westsouthatlan 1=Census region is West South Atlantic 





Mountain 1=Census region is Mountain 
0=Census region is not Mountain 
  4.88 
95.22 
  4.80 
95.20 
Pacific 1=Census region is Pacific 







 Mean  
Percentage 
Salary Increase   
Real percentage salary increase of the employees 





Log of real average salary of employees  10.12 
Average salary Real average salary of employees between 1986 
and 1999 
 26472.29 
Priexp Prior experience in years before joining in1986 7.74   8.05 
Sqrpriexp Square of prior experience 127.4 135.04 
Grade86 Pay grade in 1986 7.14   7.08 
  N1=5675  N2=7495 
 
2. Promotion Models 
 Although past studies used earnings to measure performance, some authors 
indicated some weaknesses in this method and tried to find direct measures of on-the-job 
productivity. David A. Wise (1975) used maximum likelihood techniques to estimate a 
promotion probability to analyze the relation between job performance and education 
[Ref:2]. He thought the worker’s rate of upward movement through the grades might be a 
more direct measure of job performance than the rate of salary increase. There was a 
problem with the assumption that salary is a valid job performance measure. First, 
salaries are given to positions rather than to individuals. Therefore, salary is not totally an 
indicator of employee’s performance. Second, basic salary was automatically increased 
with years of service even if the employee was not promoted.  
Two models were specified in this thesis to estimate the effect of education on the 
promotion probability and promotion speed. In the first model, a classical binary logit 
model is used to estimate the effect of education on promotion probability. In this model, 
employees hired in 1986 are tracked until 1992 and the model dependent variable is 
coded as 0 or 1, depending on the employee’s promotion event. If an employee is 
promoted at least once before 1992, the dependent variable is coded 1. Otherwise it is 
coded 0. Since it requires time to promote in the DoD service, the promotion probability 
model analyzed a six-year period to estimate the changes in promotion. The promotion 
probability model can be written as: 
P (promotion i) = β0 + βX +ε 
Where 
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P (promotion) = the probability of promotion for employee i, 
β0 = constant term, 
β = a vector of coefficients for the X variables, and 
 ε = an error term. 
In the second model, the speed of promotion is estimated using a survival 
technique. In this model, the times to first and second promotion are estimated. The main 
advantages of this model are that it considers the censored data due to early separation, 
and it estimates both the promotion probability and the length of time required to be 
promoted to the next higher grade. The data were reorganized in order to estimate the 
time to first and second promotion. Since the dates of promotions are not recorded 
correctly in the original data, change in grades is used to indicate a promotion event and 
the speed of promotion. The data is tracked in two-year intervals. Therefore the time 
length for promotion in our data is in terms of years. 
In survival analysis, the time until an event occurs is assumed to be the realization 
of a random process. The hazard function or hazard rate is used to describe the 
probability distribution of event times. The hazard function is defined as the risk of the 
event occurring in year t+1, given that it did not occur in month t. Formally, the hazard 
function, h(t), is 
h(t)=f(t)/S(t) 
 with S(t)=Pr{T>} and f(t)=dS(t)/dt 
where S(t) is the cumulative survival function. S(t) gives the cumulative 
probability that event time T is greater than t. For example, T indicates the cumulative 
probability that an individual is promoted after month t, and f(t) is the probability-density 
function. The hazard function is used to describe the probability-distribution function in 
survival analysis because it can be interpreted as the probability an event occurs at time t 
given it did not occur at t-1.  
In the Cox proportional–hazard model with time varying covariates, the hazard 
function is given by: 
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Ln pi(t)  =α(t)+β1 Xi  + β2 Zi(t) 
where pi(t) is the hazard of promotion for individual (i) and Xi is a vector of job 
and individual characteristics that are measured at entry and that do not vary with time. 
These characteristics include race, sex, grades at promotion, and prior work experience at 
entry. Zi(t) is a vector of individual characteristics that vary with time, such as the 
cumulative number of years for which he or she received each rating level(1 to 5). 
Table 13 displays variable names, and description and the means or proportion of 
variables used in each of the three models. The second and third columns are similar in 
values since they use the same models with slightly different variables. 
Table 13.   Descriptive Statistics for Promotion Models 
 


























  9.96 
90.04 
  9.96 
90.04 
Hispanic  1=Hispanic 
0=Not Hispanic 
  3.40 
96.60 
  3.39 
96.61 










Otherace 1=Other Race 










  7.81 
92.29 
  7.71 
92.29 
  7.71 
BA86 1=Employee with a Bachelor’s degree  







MA86 1=Employee with a Master’s degree  







PH86 1=Employee with a Doctorate’s degree 
0=Employee with no Doctorate’s   
    degree 
  2.80 
97.20 
  2.77 
97.23 
  2.77 
97.23 
Supervisor 1=Employee is a supervisor in 1986. 
0=Employee is not a supervisor in 1986. 
  2.77 
97.33 
  2.70 
97.30 
  2.70 
97.30 
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Ratingbest 1=Average rating is 1 and 2 (outstanding) 
between 1986 and 1992. 
0=Average rating is 3, 4, and 5(average 






Profession 1=Employee is in a professional 
     occupation. 
0=Employee is not in a professional  







Admin 1=Employee is in an administrative  
     occupation. 
0=Employee is not in an administrative  







Technical 1=Employee is in a technical  
     occupation. 
0=Employee is not in a technical  
     occupation. 
  6.47 
93.53 
  6.44 
93.47 
  6.44 
93.47 
Clerk 1=Employee is in a clerical  
     occupation. 
0=Employee is not in a clerical  
     occupation. 
10.11 
89.89 
  9.91 
90.09 
  9.91 
90.09 
Otherwc 1=Employee is in other white-collar  
     occupation. 
0=Employee is not in other white-collar  
     occupation. 
   0.61 
99.39 
  0.50 
99.50 
  0.50 
99.50 
Fleet 1=Functional area is fleet. 
0=Functional area is not fleet. 
  7.45 
92.55 
  7.46 
92.54 
  7.46 
92.54 
Intel 1=Functional area is intelligence. 
0=Functional area is not intelligence. 
  6.34 
93.76 
  6.63 
93.37 
  6.63 
93.37 
Material 1=Functional area is material. 







Trainning 1=Functional area is training.  







Medical 1=Functional area is medical. 
0=Functional area is not medical. 
  3.09 
96.91 
  3.04 
96.97 
  3.04 
96.97 
Headqrt 1=Functional area is department  
    headquaters. 
0=Functional area is not department  
    headquaters. 
  2.86 
97.14 
  2.86 
97.14 
  2.86 
97.14 
Adminact 1=Functional area is administrative  34.60 22.82 22.82 
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     activities. 
0=Functional area is not administrative  
     activities. 
65.40 87.18 87.18 
Grade1 1=Pay grades are between 1 and 5 in  1986 
0=Pay grades are not between 1 and 5 in 




Grade2 1=Pay grades are between 5 and 9 in 1986. 
0=Pay grades are not between 5 and 9 in  




Grade3 1=Pay grades are between 10 and 13 in  
    in 1986. 
0=Pay grades are not between 10 and  
    13 in 1986. 
  1.13 
98.87 
  
Grade4 1=Pay grades are between 14 and 15 in 
    1986 
0=Pay grades are not between 14 and   
    15 in 1986. 
  0.20 
99.80 
  





1st Promote 1=The percent of 1st promotion between 
     1986 and 1999 
0=Censored due to early dropout 
 96.49 
 
  3.51 
 
2nd Promote 1=The percent of 2nd promotions  
     between 1986 and 1999 
0=Censored due to early dropout 
  94.03 
 
  5.97 
Cumrat1 The ratio of getting 1(excellent) over total 
ratings 
 18.88 23.00 
Cumrat2 The ratio of getting 2(good) over total 
ratings 
 36.21 38.06 
Continuous 
Variables 
 Mean   
Time1 Average time to first promotion (in years)    2.92  
Time2 Average time from first to second 
promotion (in years) 
    3.29 
Grade1 Average grade at first promotion    8.62  
Grade2 Average grade at second promotion     9.10 
Priexp Prior experience in years before joining in  
1986 
  8.17   8.08   8.08 




3. Retention Models 
Previous analyses have shown that the effect of personnel quality and education 
on retention is ambiguous and cannot be predicted a priori. That is, theory cannot predict 
whether higher educated personnel are more likely to stay in the civil service or less 
likely [Ref: 12].  The reason is that higher-quality personnel have better opportunities 
than lower-quality personnel, both inside and outside the civil service. Whether higher 
quality personnel are more likely to stay or to leave depends on the incentives inside or 
outside the service. On the other hand, employers want to keep qualified and experienced 
employees in their workforce. This is true because qualified and educated workers are 
helpful in increasing job productivity and decreasing the manpower costs.  
Some studies suggested that the turnover rate in the federal service is lower 
compared to the civilian sector. In 1987 Richard A. Ippolito conducted a study analyzing 
quit rates in the federal government [Ref:13]. In his study he suggested that the federal 
pension system imposed large penalties on workers who quit early because the portion of 
pay in the form of pensions was much higher for federal workers than comparable non-
federal workers. As a result, the quit rate was lower for federal employees. 
Two retention models were specified to analyze the effect of graduate education 
on retention of DoD civilian employees with the expectation that employees will act as 
utility maximizers. This theory supports the idea that employees would prefer to stay in 
the civilian service if the value of continued federal service exceeds the value of a job in 
the private sector. 
The variables that are assumed to affect retention are mainly personal and job 
characteristics. Consequently, the model includes variables related to personal 
characteristics such as sex, race, age, and veteran status.  Education, veteran status and 
performance rating are included in the model. Other variables are added to the model to 
control for functional areas and regional location. 
 The first retention model is estimated using a binary logit technique for 
employees hired in 1986. In this model, employees are followed until 1992 to see 
whether they are still in the service or not. If they are still in the service, the dependent 
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variable is coded 1. Otherwise it is coded 0. The basic binary logit model can be written 
simply as follows:  
P (retention) = β0 + βX +ε 
Where 
P (retention) = the probability of staying for employee i, 
β0 = constant term, 
β = a vector of coefficients for the X variables, and 
 ε = an error term. 
The second retention model is a survival model based on a Cox regression. In this 
model, the time to separation is estimated. The data sample contains employees hired in 
1986. These employees are tracked up to 1999, the end of the data. During this 14 year-
period, snapshots of employees were taken every two years, except for the last year, 
1999. Since Cox regression also takes into account the censored elements, employees 
who are not separated at the end of the data are used to indicate censored data. The 
dependent variable is characterized by the time to separation in years. The explanatory 
variables consist of personal characteristics such as sex, race, education, occupation 
variables, supervisory position and veteran status. are added to the model. The Cox 
regression model can be written in equation as follows: 
lnSi(t)  =α(t)+β1 Xi  + β2 Zi(t) 
where Si(t) is the hazard of separation for individual (i) and Xi is a vector of job 
and individual characteristics that are measured at entry and that do not vary with time. 
These characteristics include race, sex, and prior work experience at entry. Zi(t) is a 
vector of individual characteristics that vary with time, such as the cumulative number of 
years for which he or she received each rating level (1 to 5) until separating or the data 
ends. Table 14 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used for the retention logit 




Table 14.   Descriptive Statistics for Retention Models 
 



















Hispanic  1=Hispanic 
0=Not Hispanic 
  3.72 
96.28 
  3.84 







Otherace 1=Other Race 
0=Not Other Race 
10.15 
89.85 




  7.26 
92.74 
  7.26 
92.74 
BA86 1=Employee with a Bachelor’s degree  





MA86 1=Employee with a Master’s degree  





PH86 1=Employee with a Doctorate’s degree 
0=Employee with no Doctorate’s degree 
  2.78 
97.22 
  2.67 
97.33 
Supervisor 1=Employee is a supervisor. 
0=Employee is not a supervisor.  
  2.81 
97.29 
  3.17 
96.83 
Profession 1=Employee is in a professional occupation. 
0=Employee is not in a professional  





Admin 1=Employee is in an administrative occupation. 
0=Employee is not in an administrative  





Technical 1=Employee is in a technical occupation 
0=Employee is not in a technical position 
  7.30 
92.70 
  8.66 
91.34 
Clerk 1=Employee is in a clerical occupation 





Otherwc 1=Employee is in other white-collar occupation.
0=Employee is not in other white-collar  
    occupation. 
  0.60 
 
99.40 
  0.70 
 
99.30 
Fleet 1=Functional area is fleet.   6.97 11.88 
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0=Functional area is not fleet. 93.03 88.12 
Intel 1=Functional area is intelligence. 
0=Functional area is not intelligence. 
  5.97 
94.03 
  5.82 
94.18 
Material 1=Functional area is material. 





Trainning 1=Functional area is training. 
0=Functional area is not training. 
  4.56 
95.44 
  4.39 
95.61 
Medical 1=Functional area is medical. 
0=Functional area is not medical. 
  5.94 
94.06 
  5.50 
94.50 
Headqrt 1=Functional area is department headquarters. 
0=Functional area is not department 
    headquarters.    
  3.06 
96.94 
  2.94 
97.06 
Adminact 1=Functional area is administrative activities. 
0=Functional area is not administrative  







Retent92 1=Still in the servce in 1992 




Sepevent 1=Separated from the service before 1999 
0=Censored due to the end of data 
 50.8 
49.02 
Cumrat1 The ratio of getting 1 (Outstanding) over total 
ratings 
 21.86 
Cumrat2 The ratio of getting 2(good) over total ratings  27.32 
Continuous 
Variables 
 Mean  
Ratingtop 1=Average rating is below 3 (the best) between 
1986 and 1999. 
0=Average rating is 3, 4, and 5 (average and  
    bad) between 1986 and 1999. 
  1.29  
Time  Average time of staying in the service  9.905 
Age86 Employees’ age at entry in 1986 30.50 30.51 
Sample Size  N=6177 N=6800 
 
4. Performance Rating Model  
Performance ratings are done every year in the DoD civilian service. The ratings 
are a report of the job performance of the employee for the year. But the ratings might not 
reflect the true performance of the employee’s performance due to the subjectivity of the 
evaluations.  According to Muchinsky, [Ref:14] there are three common weaknesses of 
supervisor or manager evaluations of their employees. First, since employees are 
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evaluated by many managers, varying ratings may be observed even for the same job 
performance. Some managers or supervisors are very strict raters while others are lenient 
raters. Therefore, ratings might be overestimated or underestimated due to the 
subjectivity of managers. 
Second, the employee’s characteristics may influence the raters. The employee 
might have a good rapport with the manager due to the personal characteristics of the 
employee or vice versa. This relationship then affects the perceptions of the manager 
about the employee’s job performance. As a result, the rater may tend to evaluate the 
employee very good or very bad according to his one-sided perception of an employee. 
Third, some managers tend to avoid trouble by not giving high or low grades. In 
this case, managers do not want any trouble ensuing from the evaluations. The rater may 
give middle level ratings to keep themselves in a safe position. 
Despite all these weaknesses, performance ratings are important indicators of an 
employee’s performance.  Employees are classified or at least promoted according to the 
results of these ratings. Therefore, I have built two models to see the effect of personal 
and job characteristics on ratings. The first model analyzes the percentage of “excellent” 
ratings. The regression model is used to estimate the effect of graduate education and 
other personal characteristics on the ratio of cumulative rating 1 (Outstanding) over total 
ratings as a dependent variable for the six-year period. The model can be written as 
follows:  
Y = β0 + β1X +ε 
Where 
Y = the ratio of getting 1(outstanding) over total ratings until 1996 for employee i, 
β0 = constant term, 
β1 = a vector of coefficients for the X variables,  
X = the variables that have effect on performance rating, and 
 ε = an error term. 
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The second model is built to differentiate whether employees hired in 1986 
reached supervisor status.  To be selected as a supervisor, employees must prove their 
ability and skill at their jobs. Therefore, being a supervisor can be an indicator of job 
performance. The binary logit model is used to see the effect of graduate education on 
being selected for a supervision job. Employees hired in 1986 are tracked until 1992. If 
the employee is selected to be a supervisor during this period, then the dependent variable 
is coded 1; otherwise it is coded 0. The model can be described as follows: 
 P (Supervisor i) = β0 + β1X +ε 
Where 
P (Supervisor) = the probability of being a supervisor for employee i, 
β0 = constant term, 
β1 = a vector of coefficients for the X variables, 
X = the variables that affects being a supervisor, and 
 ε = an error term. 
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the rating models are displayed in 
Table 15.   
Table 15.   Descriptive Statistics of Performance Ratings Model  
 






















Hispanic  1=Hispanic 
0=Not Hispanic 
  3.80 
96.20 
  3.46 
  9.54 






Otherace 1=Other Race 
0=Not Other Race 






  7.10 
92.90 
  7.23 
92.77 
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BA86* 1=Employee with a Bachelor’s degree  





MA86 1=Employee with a Master’s degree  





PH86 1=Employee with a Doctorate’s degree 
0=Employee with no Doctorate’s degree 
2.59 
97.41 
  3.26 
96.74 
Supervisor 1=Employee is a supervisor. 
0=Employee is not a supervisor.  
  3.26 
96.84 
 
Profession* 1= Employee is in a professional occupation. 
0= Employee is not in a professional 





Admin 1=Employee is in an administrative  
     occupation. 
0=Employee is not in an administrative  





Technical 1=Employee is in a technical occupation. 
0=Employee is not in a technical position. 
9.29 
90.71 
  8.66 
91.34 
Clerk 1=Employee is in a clerical occupation 





Otherwc 1=Employee is in other white-collar  
     occupation. 
0=Employee is not in other white-collar  
     occupation. 
  0.75 
 
99.25 
  0.70 
 
99.30 
Fleet 1=Functional area is fleet. 





Intel 1=Functional area is intelligence. 
0=Functional area is not intelligence. 
  5.64 
94.36 
  5.82 
94.18 
Material* 1=Functional area is material. 





Trainning 1=Functional area is training.  
0=Functional area is not training. 
  4.09 
95.91 
  4.39 
95.61 
Medical 1=Functional area is medical. 
0=Functional area is not medical. 
  5.72 
94.28 
  5.50 
94.50 
Headqrt 1=Functional area is department headquarters. 
0=Functional area is not department  
    headquarters. 
  3.21 
96.89 
  2.94 
97.06 
Adminact 1=Functional area is administrative activities. 
0=Functional area is not administrative 







Cumrat** The ratio of getting 1 (Outstanding) over total 
    ratings between 1986 and 1994 
13.93 21.86 
Sample Size  N=7811 N=2970 
*Base variables 


























IV. RESULTS OF PERFORMANCE MODELS 
This chapter presents the results of four different performance models: salary, 
promotion, retention, and performance ratings presented in Chapter III. Each model 
explains separately the statistical significance of the explanatory variables, the effects of 
these variables on the performance measures, and the significance of the overall model.  
A. RESULTS OF SALARY MODELS 
Two salary measures were used to estimate the effect of graduate education on the 
earnings of the DoD civilian employees. The first model examines the average 
percentage salary increases of employees hired in 1986 and who remained employed in 
the federal service until 1999. In this model those who are miscoded in the salary 
percentage increase are deleted leaving 5,675 observations. The first model is estimated 
by ordinary least squares techniques. The effects of education and other explanatory 
variables on salary are measured in percentages since the dependent variable is already 
measured as the percentage increase of salary. The results of the salary change model are 
shown in Table 16.   
The second model estimates the effect of education on the average salary of 
employees while employed in the federal service. Average salaries are also measured in 
real terms. A semi-log salary model is specified to estimate the effect of education and 
other explanatory variables on average salary. Employees who were hired in 1986 are 
used in the model providing 7,495. The interpretation of the coefficients of the 
independent variables is easy to understand since a one-unit change in the explanatory 
variables will affect the dependent variable in percentage terms. Specifically, a one-unit 
change will affect the dependent variable by β *100 (β is the coefficient of an 
explanatory variable). Table 17 shows the results of the average salary model. Both 
models were run in two steps. In the first step, the models were estimated without entry 
grade level controls. In the second step, entry grade controls were added. 
The overall significance of both models can be explained by the R2, which is a 
summary measure that indicates how well the sample regression line fits the data. 
Specifically, R2 measures the proportion of the total variation in Y (dependent variable) 
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explained by the independent variables [Ref:15]. In column 1 of Table 16, R2 is 0.1457, 
which means 14.57 percent of the variation in the average salary percentage increase is 
explained by the variation in the explanatory variables. In the third column, R2 is 0.3323. 
In Table 16, R2’s are 0.4897 in the first column and 0.6216 in the third column.     
Table 16.   Model of Average Percentage Salary Increase, 1986-1999 











Intercept  44.3492* 1.1917   94.5017* 1.6442 
Female   -0.0737 0.8002    -1.3871** 0.7082 
Black   -0.4552 1.2072    -3.4827* 1.0701 
Hispanic    -3.3933** 1.9235    -4.3944* 1.7009 
Otherace   -0.6294 1.2093    -1.8292** 1.0696 
Veteran   -1.8844 1.5832     2.0596 1.4033 
MA86   -8.4949* 1.1092     0.7943 1.0082 
PH86 -14.7923* 2.2577     6.6445* 2.0678 
Supervisor -15.5577* 2.3531     2.9111 2.1318 
Technical    2.0010 1.5129  -10.9072* 1.3765 
Administrative  12.5801* 0.9093     4.9774* 1.4104 
Clerk    6.3503* 1.2866 -11.3805* 1.6427 
Otherwc  21.6072* 4.4792 -22.2878* 4.1409 
Metropolitan    1.4017 0.9613     1.1180 0.8500 
Newengland   -0.7271 2.0917    -0.6870 1.7792 
Midatlantic    3.1911 ** 1.2980     0.3960 1.1498 
Eastnorthcent    5.7885* 1.2894    4.6072* 1.1405 
Westnortcent   -2.4403 1.8369   -5.0399* 1.6254 
Pacific    0.6312 1.0682   -2.7680* 0.9484 
Eastsouthatlan   -1.4084 1.7399   -1.5655 1.5384 
Westsouthatlan    2.6834* 1.2670   -2.2590** 1.0253 
Mountain    3.3147* 1.1488    0.7632* 1.5240 
Priexp   -1.1439* 0.1294    0.1811 0.1192 
Sqrpriexp     0.0106** 0.0043   -0.0139** 0.0003 
Grade86       N.I. N.I.   -7.1188* 0.1791 
R2      0.1457     0.3323  
Mean   41.11%   41.11%  
F Value   41.91*  117.15  
Sample size 5675 5675  
       *Significant at the 1 % level ** Significant at the 5% level 
        N.I. = not included  
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Table 17.   Average Salary Model, 1986 1999 
     Dep. Variable=ln (Av Sal) 











Intercept 10.2746* 0.0968 10.2727* 0.0087 
Female  -0.0910* 0.0063  -0.0686* 0.0055 
Black  -0.0245** 0.0096  -0.0045 0.0084 
Hispanic   -0.0102 0.0153  -0.0118 0.0132 
Otherace   0.0504* 0.0101   0.0592* 0.0087 
Veteran   0.0629* 0.0127   0.0187** 0.0110 
MA86   0.0272* 0.0087  -0.0394* 0.0077 
PH86   0.1852* 0.0183  -0.0486* 0.0168 
Supervisor   0.2214* 0.0174  -0.0200 0.0171 
Technical  -0.3975* 0.0111  -0.2505* 0.0103 
Administrative   0.1808* 0.0074  -0.1170* 0.0067 
Clerk  -0.5925* 0.0094  -0.2595* 0.0131 
Otherwc  -0.5185* 0.0318  -0.2397* 0.0287 
Metropolitan   0.0115 0.0077   0.0031 0.0066 
Newengland  -0.0265* 0.0153  -0.0188 0.0132 
Midatlantic   0.0332* 0.0104  -0.0025 0.0090 
Eastnorthcent   0.0566* 0.0107   0.0659* 0.0093 
Westnortcent -0.1182* 0.0144  -0.0800* 0.0127 
Pacific -0.0710* 0.0084  -0.0300* 0.0073 
Eastsouthatlan   0.0091* 0.0094   0.0032 0.0120 
Westsouthatlan   0.0372* 0.0103   0.0179** 0.0082 
Mountain  -0.0260* 0.0145   0.0148 0.0124 
Priexp   0.0067* 0.0010  -0.0037* 0.0009 
Sqrpriexp  -0.0001* 0.0000   0.0000 0.0000 
Grade86     N.I    N.I     Yes    Yes 
R2     0.4897    0.6216  
Mean   10.12    10.12  
F Value   311.65*    331.12*  
Sample size   7495    7495  
* Significant at one percent and lower  
** Significant at five percent level 
N.I = not included 
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In the first column of Table 16, most of the variables have the expected effectson 
the dependent variable. However, some variables like Veteran, MA86, PH86, and 
Supervisor have unexpected negative effects on salary growth rate. These variables were 
expected to have a positive impact on earnings as suggested by past studies and human 
capital theory. Employees with a Master’s degree received an 8.49 % lower salary growth 
compared to employees with a Bachelor’s degree. Similarly, employees with a Doctorate  
had a 14.79% lower salary growth. Employees with an additional year of prior experience 
had a 1.14 % lower salary growth.  Employees in supervisor positions at entrance also 
received a 15.55% lower salary increase. 
In column 3 of Table 16, when entry grades were included in the model, many 
variables are significant; the exceptions are Veteran, MA86, Metrop86, Priexp, 
Newengland, Westnortcent, Southatlantic, Eastsouthatlan, and Technical. The signs of 
the unexpected effects of the first model turned out to be consistent with past studies, 
even though some of these variables are not significant in the second step. For example, 
employees with a Master’s or Doctorate have 0.79% and a 6.64% higher salary growth 
within the same grades. Female employees have a lower salary growth rate than males. 
Black, Hispanic, and other race employees experience a 3.48% 4.39%, and 1.82%, 
respectively, lower growth rate than white employees. The variable Grade86 also has a 
negative effect on the employees’ salary growth. Employees with one higher grade earn a 
7.11% lower salary growth. This shows that employees with a Master’s or a Doctorate 
are entering the DoD service at higher grades. Employees with a Master’s or Doctorate 
receive lower salary increases when compared to employees with a Bachelor’s. However, 
when entry grades are included in the model, salary increases of employees with a Master 
or Doctorate is higher than employees with a Bachelor’s. This result clearly demonstrates 
that the salary increases of all employees who enter at higher grades are lower. 
Column 1 of Table 17 shows the parameters of the explanatory variables in the 
average salary model when entry grades are not included in the model. All the 
explanatory variables are significant, except for Metropolitan and Hispanic. The average 
salaries of employees with a M.A or Ph.D are 2.72% and 18.52%, respectively, higher 
than employees with a Bachelor’s. Employees in supervisor position also earn 22.14% 
more. Similarly, veterans and employees with an additional year of prior experience, 
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respectively, earn 6.29% and 0.67 more. Employees in “administrative” jobs earn 18.08% 
more than employees in “professional” jobs, while employees in “technical” jobs, 
“clerical” jobs and “other white collar” jobs earn 39.75%, 59.25%, and 51.85% more, 
respectively. Employees in the Pacific region earn 7.10% less than employees in the 
South Atlantic census region, while employees in the East North Central Region census 
region earn 5.66% more than employees in the South Atlantic census region. 
In column 3 of Table 17, when entry grades are included in the model, the effect 
of a M.A or Ph.D became negative. This result is very surprising because the effect of a 
postgraduate degree was expected to have a positive impact on salary. This may be 
because employees with a Master’s or Doctorate remain in the service for shorter periods; 
therefore, the real average salaries are lower. As explained earlier, the model used the 
employees who were hired in 1986 and did not eliminate those who leave early. 
B. RESULTS OF PROMOTION MODELS 
Two different models were specified to estimate the effect of education on the 
promotion probability and promotion speed. In the first model, a classical binary logit 
model estimates the promotion probability. In the second model, the speed of promotion 
is estimated using a survival technique. One survival model estimates the time to first 
promotion and a second estimates the time to second promotion.  
The “goodness of fit” of the logit model and survival models can be examined by 
their -2 log L value. This value is distributed Chi-Square, and tests the null hypothesis 
that all coefficients are not different from zero. The -2 log L value of the logit model is 
3317.71 (p<.0001).  Similarly the -2 Log L values of the first and second promotion time  
survival models are 69939.215 and 67368.248, respectively (p<.0001 for both survival 
models). Another fit statistic for the logit model is the Classification Table, which 
provides the number of events and non-events in the model. The term “event” in the logit 
promotion model means that an observation that is predicted to be promoted actually gets 
promoted. Similarly, a “non-event” is an observation that is predicted not to be promoted 
and is in fact not promoted. The Classification Table shows 88.2% correctly predicted 
events and non-events. Therefore, both logit model and survival models are significant at 
all levels. 
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Intercept  2.6889*      0.1204  
Female -0.0621      0.1170 -0.0050 
Black  0.0344      0.1813  0.0030 
Hispanic  -0.1137      0.2711 -0.0105 
Otherace -0.0325      0.1527 -0.0020 
Veteran -0.0951      0.1658 -0.0087 
MA86 -0.2363**      0.1346 -0.0229 
PH86 -0.9041*      0.2231 -0.1134 
Supervisor -0.4295      0.2363 -0.0490 
Priexp -0.0572      0.0059 -0.0052 
Ratingbest  0.0867      0.1026  0.0074 
Admin -0.0220      0.1356 -0.0020 
Technical -0.0991      0.1867 -0.0091 
Clerk  0.1233      0.1812  0.0104 
Otherwc  0.4974      0.7811  0.0357 
Fleet -0.9305*      0.1597 -0.1179 
Intel  0.4974*      0.2724  0.0360 
Training -0.3987*      0.2156 -0.0413 
Medical -0.7017*      0.2221 -0.0816 
Headqrt -0.7135*      0.2430 -0.0830 
Adminact  0.2214      0.1362  0.0179 
Grade1  0.5616*      0.1463  0.0396 
Grade3 -0.6403**     0.3274 -0.0728 
Grade4 -14.9957 321.5 -0.9021 
Sample Size                                                               4498 
-2 Log L                   3317.15* 
            * Significant at the 1% level  
             ** Significant at the 5% level 
    
In the logit model, 3,954 employees are promoted out of 4,498 total employees 
(87.9%). Employees who left before 1992 are not included in the model. The logit model 
indicates that not much variation is observed on the effects of explanatory variables on 
the dependent variable since nearly all employees are promoted. However, the results 
show significant effects of graduate education. Employees with a Master’s or Doctorate 
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are 2.29% and 11.34%, respectively, less likely to be promoted than employees with a 
Bachelor’s in Table 18.  Employees in grade group 1 (Grades 1 to 5) are 7.28% more 
likely to be promoted than employees in grade group 2 (Grades 6 to 9). As expected, 
employees in grade group 3 (grades 10 to 13) and grade group 4 (grades 14 to 15) are less 
likely to be promoted. The coefficient of the group grade 4 is not significant because 
group grade 4 is already the top grade in the service and there is no promotion from this 
grade. Employees who receive the best average rating (1=outstanding or 2=exceeds fully 
successful) have the expected positive effect on promotion, but the coefficient is not 
significant. This suggests that performance ratings are not important in determining 
promotion. This is contrary to the expectation that the best ratings would affect the 
promotion probability. Another surprising result is that none of the sex and ethnicity 
variables are significant. This also contradicts the studies of Usan and Utoglu [Ref:7] and 
Asch [Ref:8]. Employees in functional areas of Training, Medical, and Headquarters are 
4.18%, 8.16% and 8.30%, respectively, less likely to be promoted than employees in the 
Material functional area.  
The survival results in Table 19 are consistent with the results of the logit model. 
In the time to first promotion model, employees with a Master’s or Doctorate are 18.10% 
(1-0.819, the hazard ratio) and 0.434% (1-0.566) less likely (slower) to be promoted, 
respectively. In the time to second promotion model, employees with a Master or 
Doctorate degree are 13.2 % (1- 0.868) and 34.9% (1-0.651) less likely to be promoted, 
respectively. In both survival models, one additional year of prior experience decreases 
the promotion probability by 1.6% and 0.4%, respectively. In both survival models, 
employees in functional areas of Training and Medical are less likely to be promoted, 
while employees in functional areas of Intelligence and Administrative activities are 
more likely to be promoted. The surprising results are that none of the sex and ethnicity 
variables are significant. Another unexpected result is that employees with good ratings 
(outstanding or exceeds fully successful) are less likely to be promoted in both models. 





Table 19.   Results of Time to First and Second Promotion 
 















Female  0.0350 0.0361 1.036  0.0677** 0.0036 1.070 
Black  0.0267 0.0527 1.027 -0.0198 0.0534 0.980 
Hispanic  -0.0189 0.0844 0.981 -0.0665 0.0860 0.936 
Otherace  0.0436 0.0493 1.045  0.0318 0.0495 1.032 
Veteran -0.0423 0.0694 0.959 -0.0355 0.0682 -0.965 
MA86 -0.1994* 0.0498 0.819 -0.1324* 0.0497 0.876 
PH86 -0.5688* 0.0977 0.566 -0.4286* 0.1005 0.655 
Supervisor -0.3281* 0.1058 0.720  0.0256 0.1015 1.026 
Priexp -0.0165* 0.0023 0.984  0.0439 0.0024 0.996 
Admin  0.1071* 0.0409 1.113 -0.0386 0.0409 0.962 
Technical -0.1582* 0.0678 1.172  0.0428 0.0684 1.043 
Clerk  0.4961* 0.0636 1.642  0.3061* 0.0598 1.358 
Otherwc  0.5959* 0.2162 1.815  0.4800** 0.2157 1.616 
Fleet -0.2178* 0.0652 0.804 -0.2698* 0.0673 0.764 
Intel  0.0743* 0.0630 1.077  0.1162** 0.0647 1.123 
Trainning -0.1685* 0.0889 0.845 -0.2200** 0.0929 0.802 
Medical -0.1142* 0.0983 0.892 -0.0258 0.1009 0.974 
Headqrt -0.0547* 0.0980 0.947  0.0742 0.0951 1.077 
Adminact  0.1208* 0.0378 1.129  0.1062 0.0372 1.112 
Cumrat1 -0.0543 0.0544 0.947  0.0502** 0.0199 0.951 
Cumrat2 -0.0223 0.0442 0.978 -0.0181 0.0178 0.981 
Time1     0.3249* 0.0091 1.385 
Grade  0.1187* 0.0064 1.126  0.1225* 0.0042 1.130 
% Censored             3.52 
-2 Log L          69939.215 
%Censored                  5.94 
-2 Log L             67368.248 
* Significant at the1% level                                    
** Significant at the 5% level 
 
C. RESULTS OF RETENTION MODELS 
Two retention models were created to analyze the effect of graduate education on 
the retention of DoD civilian employees with the expectation that the employees would 
act as utility maximizers. Theory supports the view that employees would prefer to stay 
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in the DoD civilian service if their gain within the service exceeds their gain in the 
private sector. 
The first retention model uses a binary logit technique for employees hired in 
1986. In this model, employees are followed until 1992 to see whether they are still in the 
service or not. If they are still in the service, the dependent variable is coded 1; otherwise 
it is coded 0. 
The second retention model is a survival model based on a Cox regression. In this 
model, the time to separation is estimated. The data sample contains employees hired in 
1986. These employees are tracked until 1999, the end of the data. During this 14 year-
period, snapshots of employees were taken every two years, except for the last year, 
1999. Since Cox regression also considers censored elements, employees who are not 
separated at the end of the data are used to indicate censored data, while the dependent 
variable of the time to separation in years is determined by the employees’ service years 
in DoD before separation. 
The “goodness of fit” of the models can be examined again by the -2 Log L 
values. The logit model has the -2 Log L value of 7418.591 with p<.0001. The survival 
model for retention has the -2 Log L value of 58654.031 with p<.0001. Also the 
Classification Table of the logit model predicts 77.60 percent of the “events” and “non-
events” correctly.  Based on these results, the models have explanatory power. 
In the logit model results in Table 20, 15 variables out of 20 are significant except 
for Hispanic, Veteran, Intel, Admin, and Supervisor variables. The variables have the 
expected results. For example, employees with a Master’s or Doctorate are 5.59% and 
6.39%, respectively, less likely to stay in the DoD service. Female employees are also 
5.36% less likely to stay in the service than male employees. On the other hand, Black 
and Otherrace employees are more likely to stay in the service than whites. As expected 
older employees are more likely to stay. However, employees in all functional areas are 
less likely to stay in the service than employees in material functional area. Similarly, 
employees in all occupations except for administrative occupation are less likely to stay 
in the service than employees in professional occupations. As expected in other studies, 
employees who get higher performance ratings are more likely to stay in the service. 
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Intercept -4.1000* 0.2495  
Female -0.3454* 0.0703 -0.0536 
Black  0.3344* 0.1043  0.0430 
Hispanic  -0.1081* 0.1563 -0.0161 
Otherace  0.5871* 0.1118  0.0693 
Veteran  0.0464 0.1406  0.0065 
Age86  0.0172* 0.0044  0.0024 
MA86 -0.3478* 0.0958 -0.0559 
PH86 -0.3923** 0.2056 -0.0638 
Supervisor -0.2890 0.1954 -0.0456 
Admin  0.0736 0.0832  0.0103 
Technical -0.2104** 0.1222 -0.0324 
Clerk -0.3483* 01090 -0.0560 
Otherwc -1.2064* 0.3394 -0.2394 
Fleet -0.9859* 0.1266 -0.1871 
Intel -0.1784 0.1381 -0.0272 
Trainning -1.0849* 0.1471 -0.2103 
Medical -1.8033* 0.1364 -0.3874 
Headqrt -0.8892* 0.1789 -0.1606 
Adminact -1.0849* 0.0076 -0.0384 
Ratingtop  1.3829 0.0589  0.1240 
-2 Log L               7418.591*  
Chi-Sq                 1084.596* 
             *Significant at the 1% level 
             **Significant at the 5% level    
             Ratingtop variable is reversed for statistical purposes. 
 
In the Cox regression model of retention in Table 21, similar results are found. 
For example, employees with a Master’s or Doctorate are 15.7% and 25.3%, respectively, 
more likely to leave the federal service than employees with a Bachelor degree. Again 















Female  0.34811* 0.0388 1.416 
Black -0.2958* 0.0569 0.744 
Hispanic   0.0799 0.0844 1.083 
Otherace -0.3985* 0.0628 0.671 
Veteran -0.1074* 0.0726 0.898 
Age86 -0.0071* 0.0023 0.993 
MA86  0.1454* 0.0521 1.157 
PH86  0.2258* 0.1155 1.253 
Supervisor  0.2932* 0.0910 1.341 
Admin -0.0159 0.0470 0.984 
Technical  0.2457* 0.0601 1.282 
Clerk  0.1543* 0.0564 1.167 
Otherwc  0.4788* 0.1876 1.614 
Fleet  0.6623* 0.0570 1.939 
Intel  0.5755* 0.0680 1.778 
Trainning  0.7338* 0.0825 2.083 
Medical  0.9757* 0.0717 2.653 
Headqrt  0.4764* 0.1073 1.610 
Adminact  0.0749 0.0461 1.075 
Cumrat1 -2.6935* 0.0845 0.068 
Cumrat2 -1.3891* 0.0729 0.249 
% Censored                49.19                
-2 Log L               58654.031*   
 Chi-Sq                    1892.240*                              
             * Significant at the 1% level                                    
             ** Significant at the 5% level 
 
D. THE RESULTS OF PERFORMANCE RATING MODELS 
As explained in Chapter IV, performance ratings are not perfect in measuring 
employees’ performance, but they provide some information about the overall 
performance of the employees. In estimating the relative performance of employees, two 
different models are estimated. The first model analyzes the percentage of “Outstanding” 
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ratings received by employees hired in 1986 over their service period. In other words, this 
ratio is calculated for all of the times that the employees are evaluated for their 
performance. There are 7,811 observations for this model. The dependent variable is the 
ratio of cumulative rating 1 (Outstanding) over total ratings and the model is estimated by 
OLS. The second model estimates the probability of becoming a supervisor. This model 
assumes that the better performing employees will be given a supervisor position and will 
be promoted to higher grades. Therefore, the binary logit model is used to estimate the 
probability of being selected for a supervisor position. 
The “goodness of fit” of the first regression model is examined by the R2, the 
coefficient of determination, which is .0410. Also the overall significance of the 
regression model can be measured by the F value of the model. As long as the F-value is 
significant, then the null hypothesis that there is no power of the model is rejected. In this 
model the F value of 18.52 is significant at the P>.0001 level. The “goodness of fit” of 
the logit model for being placed in a supervisor job can be measured by the – 2 Log L 
value which is 2165.949 with p=.0001. This shows us that the model has some 
explanatory power. The classification table of the model also correctly predicts 88.3% of 
the “events” and “non-events” of the model at 0.6 “cut-off” point.  
In the first model in Table22 employees with a Master’s or Doctorate are 2% and 
9.32%, respectively, more likely to obtain the highest performance ratings than 
employees with a Bachelor’s degree. Also Black, Hispanic, and other race employees in 
the federal service are less likely to obtain the top ratings compared to whites.  
In the logit model for the probability of being a supervisor, results are consistent 
with the first model for example, employees with a Master’s or Doctorate are 8.8% and 
16.8%, respectively, more likely to be a supervisor when the top rating variable is 
excluded from the model. However, when the top rating variable (Cumrat) is included in 
the model the effect of a Master’s or Doctorate dropped to 4.96% and 8.84%, 






















           
 
          * Significant at 1 percent level                                    












Intercept  0.1216* 0.0047 
Female  0.0089 0.0055 
Black -0.0224* 0.0082 
Hispanic  -0.0258** 0.0128 
Otherace -0.0216** 0.0085 
Veteran  0.0572* 0.0100 
MA86  0.0201* 0.0073 
PH86  0.0932* 0,0156 
Supervisor  0.0645* 0.0141 
Admin  0.0235* 0.0065 
Technical -0.0240* 0.0091 
Clerk  0.0049 0.0811 
Otherwc -0.0298 0.0283 
Fleet  0.0052 0.0083 
Intel  0.0243** 0.0109 
Trainning  0.1123* 0.0130 
Medical  0.0492* 0.0113 
Headqrt  0.0106* 0.0144 
Adminact -0.0194* 0.0619 
Sample Size 7811 
R2                                                              .041 
F Value                             18.52
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Table 23.   Logit Model of Achieving Supervisor Status 
 















Intercept -2.1244* 0.1054  -2.7918* 0.1502  
Female -0.0367 0.1452 -0.0034 -0.0804 0.1473 -0.0042 
Black -0.6430* 0.2472 -0.0476 -0.5519* 0.2502 -0.0236 
Hispanic   0.0429 0.3146  0.0042  0.1194 0.3210  0.0069 
Otherace -0.5233* 0.2159 -0.0406 -0.3689** 0.2184 -0.0170 
Veteran  0.8922* 0.1874  0.1191  0.8946* 0.1910  0.0727 
MA86  0.7050* 0.1523  0.0880  0.6734* 0.1549  0.0496 
PH86  1.1545* 0.2495  0.1681  1.0269* 0.2524  0.0884 
Admin  0.0503 0.1490  0.0049  0.0427 0.1511  0.0024 
Technical -0.2404 0.2929 -0.0192 -0.2741 0.2463 -0.0132 
Clerk -1.3058* 0.3093 -0.0754 -1.3136* 0.3108 -0.0414 
Otherwc -0.2191 0.7911 -0.0192 -0.3383 0.8057 -0.0158 
Fleet  1.1760* 0.1963  0.1725  1.0358* 0.2001  0.0895 
Intel  0.2140* 0.3242  0.0222  0.0708 0.3279  0.0040 
Trainning  0.3673 0.2813  0.0404  0.2515 0.2853  0.0153 
Medical  0.3347 0.3314  0.0364  0.1555 0.3349  0.0091 
Headqrt  0.1220 0.3254  0.0122  0.0730 0.3280 -0.0037 
Adminact -0.4036* 0.1562 -0.0328 -0.3066** 0.1580 -0.0145 
Cumrat     1.0171* 0.1428  0.0872 
-2 Log L                        2165.949*                                
Chi-Sq                             174.374*                                
-2 Log L             2165.949* 
Chi-Sq                231.273* 
*Significant at the 1% level                                    







IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis analyzed the relationship between graduate education and the job 
performance of DoD civilian employees. In the thesis, four proxy performance measures 
(salary, promotion, retention, and performance ratings) were used to gauge the effect of 
advanced education on employee productivity. The results in these models are generally 
consistent with previous studies. 
First of all, employees with a Master’s or Doctorate at entry have lower real 
salary growth rates increases than employees with only a Bachelor’s degree.  However, 
when the GS entry grades are included in the model, the effect of graduate education on 
real salary growth rate became positive indicating higher growth rates for employees with 
graduate degrees. In the second model of annual average salaries, the results are as 
expected and show that employees with a Master’s or Doctorate earn more on average 
than employees with a Bachelor’s. However, when GS entry grades are included in the 
model the effect of graduate education became negative. This result was surprising and 
may be explained by the shorter tenure of employees with a Master’s or Doctorate in the 
DoD civilian service. All of these results are somewhat consistent with the Usan and 
Utoglu study [Ref:7] and Asch [Ref:8]. 
In analyzing promotion outcomes, two different measures are used. The first one 
measures the promotion probability, and the second one measures promotion speed. In 
the promotion probability model, employees with a Master’s or Doctorate are less likely 
to be promoted. In the promotion speed model, the results indicate employees with a 
Master’s or a Doctorate are slower to attain a promotion than employees with a 
Bachelor’s degree. Usan and Utoglu found similar results indicating that the effect of 
graduate education on the promotion probability was lower. Asch also suggested that 
even though employees with a Bachelor’s degree promoted faster, it does not always 
mean that advanced education slows the pace of promotions. Surprisingly, the results 
here show that having top performance ratings does not affect the speed of first 
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promotion. However, receiving top performance ratings does have a positive effect on the 
second promotion speed. 
The results of both binary logit and Cox regression analyses of retention are 
consistent with previous studies of DoD civilian employees. Previous analyses found that 
the effect of personnel quality and education on retention is ambiguous and cannot be 
predicted a priori since higher qualified personnel have better opportunities both inside 
and outside the federal service. In the binary logit model, employees with a Master’s or 
Doctorate are 5.38% and 6.69%, respectively, more likely to leave the service. Similarly, 
in Cox regressions of time to separation, employees with a Master’s or Doctorate leave 
federal service 15.7% and 25.3%, respectively, sooner than employees with a Bachelor’s 
degree. The Cox regression model gives similar results. As in previous studies, 
employees with good performing ratings are more likely to stay in the service since 
superior rating indicates a good match between employees and the job has been 
established.   
The results of a binary logit model for being a supervisor and a regression model 
for the percent of top ratings both indicate that employees with higher education are more 
likely to be a supervisor and to receive higher performance ratings in the federal service.  
In summary, employees with a Master’s or Doctorate gain more and receive 
higher salary increases in the service. However, employees with a Master’s or Doctorate 
are promoted slower since they are placed at the higher GS grades at entry in the service, 
which hinders subsequent promotion. Even though employees with a Master’s or a 
Doctorate receive the best performance ratings and are more likely to be selected as 
supervisors, they leave the service earlier than other employees. This result supports the 
concept that the incentives of the outside market exceed the incentives inside the federal 







Initially, a new data set should be gathered for further research to see more recent 
changes in the DoD civilian service. Some miscoding or some flaws, especially in the 
education levels, the performance ratings, and the annual salaries of personnel data file 
exist in the DMDC file. The new data set should provide information on the source of 
education, namely, whether the employees paid for higher education or whether DoD 
shared the cost of education. By basing the effect of graduate education on the source of 
education the results can be more informative for personnel policy changes. 
Secondly, any bonuses, which the employees received in a year, should be added 
to the personnel data so that the effect these bonuses have on retention can be measured 
and the relationship between the earnings and retention can be evaluated for the purpose 
of keeping higher quality employees in the service. Also each occupation must be 
compared to the civilian counterparts in terms of earnings or earnings increase in each 
year so that personnel managers can take precautions to keep higher quality personnel 
from leaving.    
Finally, research should be conducted on whether the retention of higher-level 
personnel is sufficient to meet current and future personnel requirements. In this analysis 
higher educated personnel are more likely to leave the service early. How does this 
behavior affect the requirements of each occupation? Future research should also conduct 
a cost-benefit analysis of the higher educated personnel to fill the gaps or requirements 
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APPENDIX  DEFENSE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL DATA FILE LA YOUT (8609 THROUGH 9902) 
                                              (DA T A ELEMENTS USED IN THE THESIS) 
                                                 (Source: Defense Manpower Data Center 
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